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Abstract:  This chapter is an extensive review of the existing literature on international 
migration of labour and its close interactions with international trade in goods and services.  
In addition, we provide a brief model to show that emigration of labour from a developing 
country has strong implications for the domestic skilled to unskilled wage movements.  In 
fact, depending on intensity assumptions across sectors and emigration of skilled or 
unskilled workers, the wage gap may increase or decrease.              
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1. Introduction 
 
Labour flows from the poor to the rich nations have been a crucial component of 
 international economic relations at least to the extent it affects political debate in the 
developed countries. While international wage differentials should be the major driving 
force behind such movements, mass migration has also been caused by political violence, 
oppression and natural calamities. Although theoretical support for the relation between 
relative income and mass migration is easy to establish, empirical verification for such a 
connection has been difficult to find. Total international migration, as of present, is 
estimated at 100 million, less than two percent of world population. About three-fourths of 
the world population lives in countries whose per-capita income is less than one-tenth of the 
average in the capital rich countries. Yet, international migration in aggregate has an 
extraordinarily low responsiveness (elasticity) to international income and wage 
differences. Changes in international wage differentials do not necessarily translate into 
changes in migration. 
 If one seeks to find the answer to the above puzzle exclusively in the domain of 
economic incentives, frustration is inevitable. A recent study by the OECD Development 
Centre (1996) precisely tries to do this and reflects very little on the political issues that 
affect international migration. The fact, that the capital rich nations have never treated the 
issues of capital and labour mobility on the same footing, seems to bypass a lot of 
discussions on migration. Since a large part of our analysis will also evolve around 
economic issues, one should be aware of the limitations of such analyses. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a broad overview of the literature 
 2
 on international migration, identify the major areas of research and reflect on the 
contemporary policy perspective from the viewpoint of the developing world. 
 The first part of the paper, section 2, deals with a survey of the conventional results. 
It mainly focuses on the aggregate welfare implications of factor flows in general and 
labour flows in particular. Empirical evidence, on trade reform, international mobility of 
labour, “migration hump” and the long run relationship between trade and migration, is 
briefly discussed. 
 Mobility of labour as a heterogeneous factor and the impact of such mobility on 
wage inequality, unemployment and capital formation will be discussed in section 3. We 
shall attempt a simple and tractable way of understanding the problems associated with 
labour flows from developing countries. 
 The way emigration helps the process of development of a poor economy has to do 
with the expansion of capital stock, physical and human. This may entail a process of rising 
wages and savings. Such a mechanism may fail to operate due to various reasons. Also 
there is the issue of ‘brain-drain’, which may be detrimental to the process of development. 
Large outflow of skilled people can promote or hurt local skill or capital formation. Section 
4 will be devoted towards these issues. Section 5 will conclude the paper.  
 
2. Overview      
W.R. Bohning (1984) is precise in commenting that the effects of international 
migration depend crucially on the type of movement involved. Every type entails different 
effects on the receiving as well as the sending country. The typology that follows takes as 
its starting point the fact that it is the state as an institution rather than the migrant as an 
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actor which determines contemporary patterns of migration, and it is based on the following 
definitions of regular migrants. 
Regular migrants are non-nationals who possess the authorizations of the state in 
whose territory they are, that are required by law in respect of entry, stay or work (if they 
are economically active) and who fulfil the conditions to which their entry, stay or work are 
subjects. 
Regular migration is shaped by economic, political and social forces, primarily 
those of migrant-receiving countries and looked at from their viewpoints, two broad 
categories, each having several sub-categories can be distinguished. The first category 
relates to a policy that does not subject either the stay or the work of non-nationals to 
restrictions (except in respect of work that involves the exercise of official authority). Three 
sub-categories under this type can be identified. 
(a) There are free migration policies under which countries abolish substantive 
entry, residence and labor market controls for specified nationalities. This 
holds true in for instance, the EEC, the Nordic Community Labour Market, 
the Trans-Tasman Agreement between Australia and New Zealand and that 
for Syrian Arab Republic in respect of Arab Nationals; 
(b) Foreigners may be admitted with a view to be granted permanent residence 
and in the hope that they would become future citizens. Australia and many 
English-speaking and Spanish speaking countries of the Americas are 
perhaps best known for having pursued such a policy, although this was by 
no means the only type of policy they adopted at one time or another; 
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(c) Non-nationals may be permitted to stay indefinitely, in the cases where after 
a period of time the general restrictions on stay and work are lifted as in 
many West European countries or where the foreigners who do not qualify 
for naturalization or who do not wish to change their nationalities are 
enabled to stay, as in the U.S. 
 
The other broad category, where regularly admitted migrants are subjected to 
 limitations on stay or work can be divided into at least two sub-categories. 
(a) Contract Migration, which usually involves only wage and salary earners. It 
can once again take several forms: individual as opposed to collective 
contract migration and migration where the workers are employed on 
ordinary jobs or as project-tied migrants. Contract migration has been given 
such names as “workers of distinguished merit and ability”, or such labels as 
“ guest worker”. 
(b) Official and business migration is the other sub-category. It covers all 
economically active persons and comprises for e.g. diplomatic or assimilated 
personnel, transport or media representatives, entertainers or sportsmen, 
investors or traders and the great variety of employees moving under the 
auspices of MNCs. 
This brief excursion into the typology indicates how diverse contemporary  
migration is. Visibly, this is a shift from the Classical theory of labour migration, in which 
economists tended to make the simplifying assumptions that labour could be regarded as 
homogenous and in the long run perfectly mobile within one country. Apart from that, there 
was the tendency of a generalization that more attention to capital than labour as a factor of 
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production was bestowed upon by the Classical approach and most models of economic 
change based on this approach presupposes very similar behaviour of capital and labour in 
so far as geographical movement is concerned. They also regarded labour as they regarded 
capital as a supply ready to meet a demand initiated exogenously and that such supply could 
vary independently.  If the concept of maximization of returns holds good in this 
connection, it would be observed that a migration model based on the shifting advantages 
over different geographical locations is well developed. In this classical theory the 
advantage was probably thought of as fertile land, later mineral resources and still later 
advantages derived from the size of the market. These would primarily attract employers, 
who would then generate a certain demand for labour and cause to initiate a migratory 
process. 
 Nevertheless, even a rigorous classical model would admit that in the short run 
labour is to be paid higher wages in order to be attracted to a certain country, while such 
induced or may be even autonomous movements in the long run would cause to equalize 
wages across nations. This stands out as an equilibrium system in the sense that, except for 
exogenous shocks, regional wage differentials will tend to be lowered, and the optimum 
system where each worker receives exactly his marginal product will be continually 
approached. Models of the kind presupposes that exogenous shocks can be taken care of 
without forcing the system too far out of equilibrium, and that all migratory patterns might 
be self-correcting, such that following any shock (for e.g. a change in the export market for 
a particular industry or a natural resources discovery as North Sea gas) the wages in the 
migrant-sending countries will eventually increase and cause to reverse the direction of 
migration. However, a situation like this might emerge only with a static population or with 
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a fixed growth in population, the rate of which do not adversely affect the causes and 
consequences of migration.  
Evidently this might sound too simplistic and a variant of the structure is brought 
forth in another set of models which are essentially Keynesian, showing that capital was 
likely to move in the same direction as labour and in effect would intensify and perpetuate 
the disequilibrium between the gaining and the losing areas. The depressed areas of 1920, 
which then had much higher unemployment and much higher emigration rates than the 
remainder of the country (Great Britain, here) were still mainly the depressed areas of 
1930s. in spite of a very large net loss of migration over the 20 years. A solution to this 
problem was sought in Barlow’s Report1 demanding government intervention in the form of 
assisting or persuading firms to move into declining regions so that the continuing process 
of declining would be halted and then reversed.  
The above two models take it for granted that the level of employment (possibly 
through its effect on the wage rate) is the determinant of migration. So, the question as to 
whether migration is self-correcting or cumulative resolves itself into a question of 
migration’s effect on future employment and wages. It may be trivially true that few people 
wishing to remain in employment move to new areas beyond commuting distance of their 
existing jobs without having good reasons to believe that they will find employment there. 
But the models would apply only if employment or wage levels determined net migration 
flows, and most country experiences suggest strongly that there is no such simple 
relationship.    
                                                          
1 Barlow Report: Royal Commission on “Distribution of the Industrial Population”, Cmd. 6153, HMSO 
(London 1940). 
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Once it is accepted that the causes of migration patterns are more complex than, and 
not necessarily related to employment, it becomes easier to understand why the economic 
models of the above types appear to help so little in evaluating questions about either 
economic causes or effects of migration and why newer sophisticated analyses are 
necessitated. In other words, to move towards a more realistic explanation of migration, one 
has to take into account a number of other economic variables, viz., congestion of the state 
of an areas infrastructure; geographical factors, viz., the distance from the nearest major 
population centre; psychological factors, viz., the image of an area and political factors, like 
new towns or development area policy (Lind, 1969). Naturally, this multiplicity of factors 
produce a far more complex picture and allows for new approaches to the central question 
about migration trends – whether they are self-correcting and economically efficient or 
cumulative and undesirable, to interpret on the whole, the features in terms of present and 
future policies. 
 
2.II Gerking and Mutti (1983) are of the opinion that the “guest worker” programmes 
initiated by western European nations and more recent surge of illegal immigration into the 
U.S. from Latin America are but two examples of movements of predominantly unskilled 
workers from less developed countries to developed countries. Understandably, such labour 
movements suggest that the wages paid to unskilled workers in the receiving countries 
should fall whereas, that paid to their counterparts in the country of emigration should rise. 
This appears to explain in a straightforward manner, why proposed liberalization of 
immigration restrictions in developed countries often met with strenuous objections from 
labour groups, while at the same time government officials in LDCs tend to view 
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emigration as a vent for surplus unskilled labour. The authors have established in this paper 
that, in the context of a static general equilibrium model, when there is a movement of 
unskilled workers from LDCs to DCs: 
(i) Wages paid to this type of labour are likely to fall in both countries, 
while the returns to all capital owners rise. 
(ii) The developed country accumulates capital at the expense of the 
LDCs. 
They also predicted at that stage that, if production technologies differ sufficiently 
 across countries, then the absolute disparity between the wage rates paid to unskilled 
labour in the two countries may actually increase, which then combined with other results is 
indicative of the fact that, the then dilemma regarding illegal immigration into the U.S. 
could be persistent – and in reality it has been because, “ even leaving aside the 
compounding factor of divergent population growth rates, incentives for entry brought 
about by international wage rate differences may not tend to disappear when emigration to 
the U.S. occurs.”   
 Sapir (1993) also witnesses that during the 1960s and 1970s employment of foreign 
labour became an important aspect of Western European economies. The fact suggests that, 
western European capitalists in structurally weak sectors might have used immigration 
policies as a means of remaining competitive. Clearly, one way for industries in the 
industrialized countries to resist the competition from less developed labour-abundant 
countries, is try to reduce their labour costs and therefore there has to be a crucial 
relationship in a capital-abundant economy, between trade competition and immigration 
from labour-abundant countries. He proposes in this regard, that, “within the Ricardo-Viner 
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(sector-specific) model, a host country protecting its importable sector might experience a 
welfare gain or loss from an inflow of foreign labour which receives its full (tax-free) 
marginal product. If workers are paid only in terms of the importable good there will be a 
gain; if they are paid only in terms of the exportable good, there might be either a loss or a 
gain. Moreover, these results hold regardless of whether the host country is labour-or-
capital-abundant.” 
 While Sapir’s conclusion remains conditional and therefore open-ended, Wong 
(1983) in his paper rank-orders a set of policies or ‘regimes’, from the viewpoint of overall 
welfare impact. 
Two possibilities have come up in this paper: 
(a) Given a well-behaved social utility function and diversification in 
production, the more the national factor-price ratio deviates from and on the 
same side of the autarkic factor price ratio, the higher welfare level the 
country will have. 
(b) Given a well-behaved social utility function and diversification in 
production, the more the combined (national and foreign) factor endowment 
ratio deviates from and on the same side of the national factor endowment 
ratio, the higher welfare level the country will have. 
 Schiff (1996) offers three scenarios under which trade and migration are 
complements rather than substitutes, i.e. when trade liberalization will temporarily lead to 
more migration, not less, creating the ‘Migration Hump’. Intuitively, trade liberalization by 
creating new employment in migrant-sending countries, provides families with a means to 
finance international migration which they could not afford in the past. Secondly, following 
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trade reforms, with sectors showing specificity in factor usage, there would be some 
economic costs involved in switching resources from one sector to another. This would lead 
to some transitional unemployment and therefore increased migration pressure. Finally, if 
(and in reality, it is) the most protected import-competing sector is labour intensive, then 
trade liberalization, renders labour unemployed. 
It follows from the concept of Migration Hump, that in the aftermath of a trade 
reform at time zero, the assumed short run complementarity between trade and migration 
will cause an increase in migration above the status-quo trajectory line, which is rising at a 
decreasing rate. On the other hand, the assumed long-run substitutability between trade and 
migration will cause a downslide of the hump much below the trajectory line. So, the 
migration hump in the short run suggests a net long run ‘savings’ in unwanted migration as 
a result of trade reforms. 
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Figure 1. Migration Hump, Plateau and Trough 
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It is also assumed in this regard that, the duration and amplitude of the hump are relatively 
small. Thus, when viewed over a long enough period of time, there is less migration with 
trade than without it. 
 If however, trade and migration are substitutes both in the short and in the long run, 
the migration hump becomes a migration trough. This view is supported by standard trade 
theory, whereby, specific endowment (L and K) rich countries end up specializing in the 
commodities they have comparative advantage in. On the other hand, if the standard 
neoclassical assumptions are relaxed, then even the traditional 2 x 2 x 2 framework might 
evoke complementarity between trade and migration and henceforth a migration plateau. 
These are however based on the underlying assumptions that, markets are perfect, 
adjustments are instantaneous, trade is not due to scale economics and there is no disparity 
in factor productivity. These features are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 The market imperfection induced migration underlies the “ New Economics of 
Labour Migration” pioneered by Oded Stark, where migrants are viewed as financial 
intermediaries who provide their families with liquidity and income insurance. Stark (1991) 
argues that, the desire to overcome the risk and capital constraints is a primary motivation 
for migration. Previously, Katz and Stark (1986), examined the effect of migratory 
opportunities for children on fertility, when the decision by the child whether or how much 
to remit is endogenous to the analysis. International migration under asymmetric 
information has also been extensively dealt with in Katz and Stark (1987), where they 
introduce a migration model in the absence of costly ‘Signalling’ and in the presence of 
time-consuming revelation of true productivity of the migrant workers. It shows that, 
asymmetric information will tend to reduce the skill level of migrants, by changing 
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qualitatively as well as quantitatively the distribution of migrant groups in the population. 
The restoration of informational symmetry reinforces the possibility of migration only by 
the high-skill and the low-skill groups, with the middle group not migrating. With the same 
structure, Katz and Stark (1989), also show that when migration is desirable at the lowest 
skill level, introduction of asymmetric information results in a reduction of the quality and 
quantity of international migration or has no effect at all. Contrarily, when at the lowest 
skill level migration is not desirable, introduction of asymmetric information will result in 
migration by all or by none. 
 By another strand of analysis, however, the phenomenon of international migration 
is the one that is characterized by disincentives rather than incentives. It is also much more 
institutionally determined, than by free economic choices, owing to the existence of 
immigration quotas sanctioned by developed countries (by national legislation in Great 
Britain as of 1905, and in U.S. as of 1921). Conversely, there are also some potentially 
inefficient restrictions on emigration of nationals mainly in the socialist countries as also in 
the developing countries (for skilled personnel like the doctors and engineers). What 
appears on the whole with respect to the institutional question is that, there is virtually no 
international code of conduct that attends the question of how immigration restrictions 
ought to be operated. The international governance of the issue is provided only by 
fragmented attention from various agencies like ILO for foreign workers, UN High 
Commission for Refugees, UNESCO and UNCTAD for Brain Drain etc., and above all 
there has been a sustained lack of concern in attempting to set up such a supra-national 
agency (Bhagwati, 1984). 
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 It is further emphasized that, institutions showed a ‘deliberate’ lack of speed in 
response to migration that occurred in substantial magnitudes in the post-war era. On the 
question of postwar international migration flows, Bhagwati (1988) classifies the movement 
between ‘poor to poor’ countries as essentially refugee movement that between ‘poor to 
rich’ countries as emanated mainly from the west European ‘gastarbeiter’ programme or 
that in the OPEC region in late 1970s and so forth. 
 It is also very important to discuss in this light, the long-debated issue of  ‘Brain 
Drain’. As Bhagwati (1988) puts it, ‘Brain Drain’ is an ‘emotive phrase’, and preserves the 
overtone that outflow of skilled manpower is a problem. The author suggests that, a brain 
drain model and a spillover model can be identically treated and according to the empirical 
judgement it appears that, substantial outflows often create difficulties for small source 
countries with limited educational opportunities. He further points out that, for large 
countries, with wide educational network, emigration of doctors or engineers may not really 
be a problem, although emigration of ‘talented’ individuals might stall the domestic 
institution building process. However, such emigration can pave the path for improving the 
productivity of distinguished nationals as part of prestigious foreign institutions and 
enhance opportunities for other nationals to train abroad. 
 The issue of  ‘return migration’ also requires some attention in this context. Piore 
(1979) notes that, contributions by migrants in terms of the regional economics 
development or as a source of significant industrial skills have been generally elusive for 
the source countries. For the developing countries on the path of industrialization, it is 
expected that the technical requirements of the job structure would follow the technical 
evolution of the labour force. The process is such that increasing levels of education and 
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training are required of the labour force as development proceeds in order to bridge the gap 
between the skills of the labour force and the requirement of the technology that the 
countries are introducing. Return migrants in general have not contributed sufficiently 
towards overcoming this gap.      
To see empirically the issue in question, an explicit link between trade reforms and 
migration is found in Faini and de Melo (1996), who ran a macro simulation for Morocco, 
revealing that the removal of import restrictions in Morocco shifted the composition of 
demand in favour of foreign goods. The total impact on employment in the short-run 
depends critically on the labour-intensity of exports to import-competing goods and in the 
Moroccan case labour intensive exports expanded (because of real exchange rate 
depreciation) quickly. There was a reduction of total output on account of now dearer 
imported inputs and despite all this no distinct effect on employment is visible. The reason 
is that, the textile being the major item of trade it provided local employment as alternative 
to short-run migration.  
Lee and Roland-Holst (1996) tries a 10-country computable general equilibrium 
model (CGE), to estimate the impacts of various trade reform measures on employment in 
the Pacific basin. Though the model does not link countries on the labour side through 
migration, but trade induced changes in employment and wage disparities across countries 
suggests the direction, if not the magnitude of changes in migration pressure resulting from 
trade reform. The remarkable finding of their study is the surprisingly small impact of trade 
liberalization on total employment in the region, the reason being the fact that for all these 
countries imports were more labour intensive that exports. 
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  Other empirical support for the analysis with respect to the labour market effects of 
migration and trade comes from Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1992) in the North American 
context. They base their analysis on the 1980’s finding that the wage and employment-
population rate of less-skilled Americans, particularly young men, fell relative to the more-
skilled workers. The real earnings of 25-34 year old male high school graduates and 
dropouts declined, beginning from 1973 as reversing the historic trend. They empirically 
support the two suggested causes, (a) inflow of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal 
migrants and (b) the trade deficit. In a later article, Borjas and Freeman (1997) concluded 
that 44% of the said decline in wages (1980-1995) resulted from immigration.  
 The study by Borjas and Freeman (1997) contradicts the findings of Altonji and 
Card (1991), who computed the correlation between the fractions of immigrants in a city 
and the employment and wage outcomes of natives for 120 major SMSAs (Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas) over 1970 and 1980 censuses.  Here, the basic finding is 
that, a 1% increase in the fraction of immigrants in a SMSA reduces less-skilled native 
wages by roughly 1.2%. The least square estimates imply wage reductions of 3%. These 
were not significant.  
 According to Rivera-Batiz (1998), the U.S. economy has absorbed millions of 
workers during this century and yet earnings and living standards have generally gone up. 
The explanation is that increased labour supply tends to generate other mechanisms in the 
economy that increase the demand for labour and therefore employment. Any influx that 
significantly reduces wage in a particular labour market also tends to attract industries in 
that labour market. Given cheaper labour further reinforced by the continuous process of 
immigrant inflow, leads to setting of competitive prices in these industries. Over time, then, 
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there is a higher demand facing these industries and the downward pressure on wages 
exerted by increased stock of labour is subsequently reversed as demand rises. 
 Lastly, Kuhn and Wooton (1991) estimate the effect of immigration on the U.S. 
workers. Based on 430 4-digit manufacturing industries for the years 1960, 1970, 1980 and 
1984, the estimate indicates that at least since 1970, factor intensities in U.S. manufacturing 
show consistent pattern; unskilled and skilled labour are used intensively in import-
competing and export industries respectively. They draw a conclusion by which, increased 
immigration of either skilled or unskilled workers to the U.S. will in the long-run hurt U.S. 
workers of both types and benefit owners of capital. 
 
3. Heterogeneous Skill and Welfare Impact of Migration               
An easy way to capture the issue of emigration in the context of a developing 
country is  
to construct an example where different types of labor are used for producing different 
types of goods. Skilled labour and capital produce a skilled good (X), whereas unskilled 
labour and capital produce an unskilled good (Y). 
 Following equations denote competitive conditions before the citizens decide to 
emigrate. The ‘benchmark’ model assumes a simple neo-classical world into competitive 
markets, full-employment and free trade. None of these assumptions is really necessary to 
derive the basic conclusions.  
XKXSXS Praaw =+        (1) 
1==+ YKYLY Prawa       (2) 
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where, (wS , w) are (skilled, unskilled) wages.  R is the return to capital and PX, PY prices.  
aij’s are input-output ratios dependent on factor prices. The structure here is drawn from 
Jones (1971) exhibiting a specific-factor model. This is a ‘small’ economy, which faces 
exogenously given PX in the rest of the world. 
 Consider a case where the rest of the world unskilled wage w* is greater than w0, the 
initial one prevailing within the economy. This calls for labour outflow. Since w* cannot be 
affected by such a movement as the country concerned is small, w0 has to rise up to w*. 
 As unskilled labour emigrates, local supply of labour falls and w rises. Under the 
standard ‘Inada’ type conditions,  
    
0→L
Lt
L
w
δ
δ  = ∝, w0 will rise up to w* for a finite level of outflow.     
  
 If Lm is the extent of labour outflow, then, (w* - w0) Lm will be the addition to ‘real income’ 
of this nation and hence the gain in welfare. Lm is basically export of labour and (w* - w0) is 
the additional income per unit of such exports.  
 A crucial presumption in such analysis is that the economy under consideration has 
command over this extra income. Suppose a fraction of (w* - w0) Lm is remitted, that will 
mean greater real income. Typically, the consumption standards of migrants may improve 
once they locate themselves abroad. This will tend to reduce the amount of remittance. 
 Such emigration will reduce r since local unskilled worker becomes more expensive 
to hire. As r goes down, wS moves up, given PX.  In fact if the technology in the rest of the 
world is the same as in the local economy, wS should go up to wS* and r should fall to r*. 
Thus the movement of just one type of labour leads to factor price equalization. Skilled 
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labour does not need to move further since cheaper rental on capital leads to greater skilled 
wages for the local economy. 
 An interesting implication of such an outflow can be traced to the relative income 
between the skilled and the unskilled. It can be easily checked from (1) and (2) that
0
0
w
wS  
adjusts towards *
*
w
w S  where *
*
w
w S >
0
0
w
wS .  In other words the distribution of income between 
the skilled and the unskilled can very well worsen by exporting unskilled labour.  Since 
*
*
w
w S  is given in the rest of the world and the technology is identical across the globe, the 
condition *
*
w
w S >
0
0
w
wS  boils down to the comparison of the share of capital in production 
costs of each sector, θKX relative to θKY.  If θKX > θKY, wS will rise more, thus widening the 
gap between wS and w.2 
 Movement of unskilled labour eliminates the incentive for skilled labour to move. If 
technological differences across the globe are not so prominent, relative factor abundance 
becomes crucial in dictating the wage differential and the consequent movement of labour. 
If technological gap is considerable reflecting the productivity gap of similar type of labour, 
factor prices will not be equalized between the source country and the rest of the world. But 
there will be a tendency for the wages to come together. A lot more labour has to flow out 
in that case to bring the wages into line. But once wS are the same, r in the source country 
should still be lower than r* due to the productivity gap. If the skill sector of the source 
country exhibits similar productivity with the rest of the world, wS will go up even more 
                                                          
2 For effects of immigration on wages in one commodity simple model and n-commodity generalization 
thereof, see Jones and Engerman (1997). 
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relative to the case with no productivity gap. In fact, wS is likely to be greater than wS* 
worsening the pattern of wage distribution. However, increase in w always improves 
aggregate real income of the small trading nation and therefore should be encouraged.  But 
emigration of unskilled labour may not lead to the evaporation of labour class-based 
conflict in the society. 
 The appealing property of this class of general equilibrium model is that they allow 
for imperfect factor flows within an economy, unlike the standard long-run type models. 
This also in a way captures the case of developing nations where smooth sectoral 
adjustments are difficult to conceive. Our small economy exploits further gains from trade 
allowing emigration. Note that once w0 is allowed to adjust up to w* through a continuous 
process of labour outflow, skilled production continues to expand and the local unskilled 
sector contracts. If this country has been exporting Y, factor movement substitutes for 
commodity trade --- a well-known result due to Mundell (1957). 
 One interesting and much discussed result in trade theory has to do with the effect of 
changes in factor endowments in tariff-distorted economies. Papers by Johnson (1967), 
Brecher and Alejandro (1977), Findlay (1985), Jones (1997), Neary and Ruane (1988), 
Beladi and Marjit (1992), Marjit, Broll and Mitra (1997) etc. discuss different facets of the 
problem of growth and welfare in protected economies. 
 As unskilled labour emigrates and as a result the skilled sector expands, the small 
economy may face an adverse welfare effect if the sector producing the ‘skilled’ good is 
protected to start with. Taxing imports causes distortion in consumption and further 
reduction in volume of imports will accentuate the welfare loss. This has to be offset 
against the remittance income received from the non-residents. It is obvious that allowing 
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skilled labour to go is doubly beneficial in the presence of protection, although protection 
may curtail the incentive for emigration.  However, the standard welfare reducing effect of 
growth in protected sector may not hold with imported intermediates. This has been 
recently expressed in Marjit and Beladi (1996,1999). Since the standard textbook principal 
for a small economy is not to restrict trade of any kind, opening up of trade in factors can 
mitigate the adverse welfare effect of restricting commodity trade. 
 The results discussed so far, change with introduction of unemployment. Consider a 
little twist to our existing framework. Suppose the unskilled wage is fixed at w  to reflect 
union-pressure in the presence of unemployment.  Thus given w , r is determined from (2) 
and that in turn determines wS. The amount of skilled labour determines output in the 
skilled sector and the capital to be employed there. The rest of the capital employs unskilled 
labour and in the presence of w  cannot absorb the entire unskilled labour force. It is 
obvious that if the unemployed unskilled labour starts moving out, nothing happens to the 
factor returns and the gains are enormous because for some of them the opportunity cost 
may be close to zero. 
 It is instructive to provide the list of the possible welfare impact of outward 
migration. 
1. Migration directly increases national welfare by expanding the set of 
consumption possibilities available to the locals through increased 
remittances. 
2. With unemployment it is likely that the gain will be more since the 
opportunity cost of emigration should be very low.  
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3. Typically movement of one type of labour should improve wages of other 
types by inducing a fall in the cost of capital.  
4. Apart from the static welfare effect, remittances may constitute an important 
contribution towards capital information. 
It is also instructive to look at the representative empirical evidences on some of the 
issues discussed so far. In a fairly detailed discussion on migration, remittances and capital 
flows in the context of Indian economy, Nayyar (1994) reports certain interesting facts. 
This is elaborated in table16 of Nayyar (1994).  
In 1980s remittances were equivalent to about 2% of aggregate private consumption 
expenditure, 67% of gross domestic savings and capital formation. However, the division of 
remittances into consumption and investment are not available from the macroeconomic 
data. Gulati and Mody (1985) provide an analysis, which suggests that for the state of 
Kerala, remittances were about 25% of the state domestic product.  This proportion was 
estimated to be as high as 40%-50% in some districts of the state that experienced higher 
volumes of out-migration.  
 
4. Migration and Capital Formation 
 Static welfare effects do not provide a complete picture of the welfare implications 
of emigration. To the extent capital formation assumes a crucial role in the process of 
growth and development, one must elaborate the avenues through which remittances 
stimulate the pace of investment. Remittances are likely to increase both consumption and 
savings of the local population. Empirically it is very difficult to isolate the impact of 
remittances on saving and investment at an aggregate level. As elaborated in Nayyar 
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(1994), at least in the context of the Indian economy, this has been a compelling task. Close 
scrutiny of the regions which supply substantial number of migrants to the outside world 
over a specific time period, can be a better strategy to evaluate the investment impact of 
remittances. It will be interesting to reflect on the structural features of the relationship 
between migration and capital formation. This can be done by focusing on both the supply 
side and demand side of the problem. We pick the supply side first. 
As argued earlier the inflow of amount (w* - w0)Lm adds to the real national income 
of the trading nation. A part of (w* - w0)Lm can go to augment the capital stock. In that case 
growth takes place through an increase in investment. But (w* - w0)Lm can be quite small 
relative to the size of the capital stock and nothing should change much. Also, the fraction 
of (w* - w0)Lm  set apart for raising K, can be very low depending on the time preference of 
the people deciding on the intertemporal consumption pattern of remittances. One 
interesting exercise will be to check whether priorities to invest vary across income groups. 
It is possible that a dollar, which lands in the hands of poor people representing the local 
community of unskilled migrants, will be utilized differently from the one which goes to the 
richer income group. The presumption related to the break up of the remittance into 
consumption and savings for each of the group can go either way and therefore the net 
impact on investment is anybody’s guess.  
Following recent work of Galor and Zeira (1993) or Banerjee and Newman  
(1998), one can forcefully argue that remittances to the poor segment of population can 
achieve a lot in terms of the formation of human capital. It is now well known that 
‘inequality’ of income can hamper ‘growth’ in a world with imperfect capital markets. 
Remittances can be an effective means of bypassing the ‘entry-barrier’ caused by financial 
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constraints.  In a model with multiple equilibria, unskilled migration can get the economy 
out of a ‘low level equilibrium’. 
  Typically extra income received from the migrant workers settled or 
temporarily working abroad can contribute towards local capital formation if and only if the 
investment is constrained from the supply side. It is quite possible that there might not be 
sufficient demand for investable funds since investment depends on a set of medium and 
long-term factors. Thus the prevailing macroeconomic investment should dictate whether 
investment is resource constrained. But clearly remittances can improve local infrastructural 
conditions, which in turn, may lead to more investments. Again a way of evaluating such an 
impact is to look for case studies since the aggregate data may not be suited for such an 
exercise. Whether remittances have helped the growth of small business in places like 
Kerala, is still an open question. Even if one admits that the process of human development 
in Kerala must have been influenced by the remittances from the Middle East, yet Kerala 
has not shown remarkable progress in terms of industrial investment and employment. 
These issues require substantial applied work at the micro level.3  
 One important contribution of net factor income from abroad is to allow the 
government to adjust periodic balance of payment problems. Oil boom in the mid-70s led to 
massive temporary emigration of workers, skilled and unskilled, to the Middle East. Export 
of labour was a major source of foreign exchange earnings for India, and it helped to curb 
the negative impact of trade deficits. Nayaar (1994) observes that the per capita remittance 
from the unskilled workers has been greater than the same received from the skilled 
workers.  
                                                          
3 For related work on remittances of Asian workers from Gulf countries see Gardezi (1997).  
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 It is well known that in the developing world state heavily subsidizes higher 
education and therefore promotes the growth of human capital. This is justified by the 
‘social return’ on human capital which private financiers are not likely to internalize. Large 
exodus of skilled engineers, managers, scientists and technical personnel away from the 
developing world does not allow the local economy to recover the social costs of training. 
In a way the developing world indirectly subsidizes the higher education system in the 
richer nations with high quality undergraduate training. Needless to say that a large chunk 
of such emigration eventually leads to permanent settlements. Apart from the fact that such 
brains do not produce the required externality effects on the local economy, valuable 
taxpayers’ money is hardly recovered. The pricing of higher education is a politically 
sensitive issue. Often sound economic judgement has to take a backseat because of the 
shameless hypocrisy of the so-called egalitarian student movement. Higher education 
invariably accommodates students coming from more privileged segments of the society 
and they always oppose vehemently if the subsidy is reduced even by a bit. It will be 
interesting to study the impact of subsidized education on the net resource inflow to the 
local economy and the role of emigration in dictating the magnitude of such an impact.  
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Endnotes 
1. Basic welfare function algebra involves the ‘change in welfare’ function (Caves and 
Jones, 1985). 
YXX dDdDPd +=Ω     (DX, DY are demands) 
SdwKdrdLwdLwLLdw smmm +++−−= *)( 00  
where w0 is the initial pre-emigration unskilled wage. Note that,                  
YXXsm ddPSdwKdrLLdw +=++− )(0  
since, Lm stands for export of labour. One needs to add mdLww )*( 0−  as the change 
in income due to emigration. If one uses the competitive equilibrium and full 
employment conditions, one gets d mdLww )*( 0−=Ω , as  vanishes due 
to the familiar envelope conditions, since w > w
YXX ddP +
0 it pays to send unskilled people 
abroad. 
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